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INTRODUCTION
Consumers who use stored value cards ("SVC") currently lack basic
information and even minimal legal protections.' Because of the
relatively small monetary amounts involved in SVC commerce for each
consumer, transaction costs make it infeasible to develop legal rules
through case-by-case litigation. Uniform legal standards are,
nevertheless, necessary because of consumer confusion and problems
that may arise causing monetary loss to consumers using SVCs.
Despite the recent vintage of the SVC industry, major problems
already have occurred. The Mafia has stolen more than $50 million
from consumers and phone companies through the fraudulent sales
of SVCs,2 and several issuers of SVCs have gone out of business after
selling tens of thousands of worthless SVCs.' Further, even if SVC
issues are decided by the courts, it is unlikely that uniform legal rules
could be established absent a national legal framework. The same
would be true if, in the absence of federal direction, individual states
enacted statutes to protect their citizens. Congress therefore should
enact an SVC statute to provide a legal framework for SVC systems
and require disclosures needed for consumers to make informed
choices when deciding whether to use SVCs. Such a statute would
ensure the integrity not only of SVCs, but also of other payment
systems. In addition, because SVCs are used nationally, both
consumers and industry would benefit from uniform rules.
Thus far, rather than take action, Congress has decided not to
decide. In the 104th Congress, legislators prohibited regulation of
SVC systems for the immediate future4 and ordered the Federal
Reserve Board to conduct a study of whether there is a need for
1. See Celia Viggo Wexler, OCC Lists Smart Card Risks, Urges Consumer Disclosures, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 11, 1996, at 4 (describing FDIC recommendation that banks expand SVC
consumer disclosure).
2. SeeSelwyn Raab, Officials Say Mob Is Shyiling Crimes to New Industries, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10,
1997, at Al.
3. See Gautum Naik, Sony, Your Prepaid Phone Card Has Been Deactivated, WALL ST.J., July
16, 1996, at BI; Noreen Seebacher, Communications: Prepaid Calling Cards May Not Be Smartest
Way to Stay in Touch, DET. NEWS, Nov. 14, 1996, at F5. See generally MCI's Top 10 Tips on How to
Avoid Prepaid Telephone Card Scams, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 10, 1997.
4. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2601(c), 1996
U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-1363, 3009-1363 to 1364 (1996).
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regulation.5 Although many in the industry are urging the govern-
ment not to impose rules so that SVC systems can develop in a
competitive marketplace free of legal restrictions,6 regulation likely
would have the effect of promoting SVCs. The numerous types of
SVC systems, as well as consumer confusion about these systems,
would be somewhat diminished by standardized disclosure require-
ments and rules similar to those applied to other types of payment
devices because consumer concern about the reliability of SVCs would
be ameliorated by the knowledge that a legal safety net exists. At the
same time, regulation should be designed in a manner that will not
impede further technological and marketing innovation. This can be
accomplished by avoiding, to the extent it is consistent with providing
consumers minimal protection, detailed regulation that has the effect
of dictating the architecture of SVC systems.
Part I of this Article briefly describes different SVC systems,
explaining the tremendous variety of formats and showing how this
variety will lead to consumer confusion. This problem is especially
disturbing because the cards are being marketed in a manner that
may make them attractive to consumers who have the fewest resources
to educate themselves about the risks and disadvantages of using
SVCs. Current advertising for SVCs indicates market forces probably
will not provide the information consumers need to make informed
decisions about SVCs.
Part II discusses the legal issues that may have an impact on
consumers. Many of these issues have been addressed in statutes and
regulations governing credit and debit cards. The government must
decide whether to adopt similar rules for SVCs. This Article examines
recent pronouncements by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ("FRB" and "Board"), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC").
Other issues are unique to SVC technology and call for new rules.
Part III contains a proposal for a legal framework to govern SVCs.
I. STORED VALUE CARDS: GREAT VARIETY RESULTS IN
CONSUMER CONFUSION
Stored value cards are being marketed in a wide variety of formats.
Some types of cards contain features that make them unlike other
5. See Omnibus Appropriations Act § 2601(c), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3009-1364.
6. See Ira H. Parker, Fed's Stored Value ProposalIs a Blow for Card Industry, AM. BANKER, Apr.
17, 1996, at 3 (detailing concern that regulation will hurt SVC growth); Celia Viggo Wexler,
Postpone Regulating Stored Value Cards, Bankers Urge Fed, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 1996, at 3
(describing bank opposition to SVC regulation).
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payment devices. Others, however, operate in ways that are similar
to their cousin, the debit card.' The plethora of architectural designs
is likely to confuse even sophisticated consumers. This confusion
makes regulation crucial to preserve the integrity of SVCs and
payment systems in general, to ensure that consumers have the
information necessary to decide whether to use SVCs, and to
guarantee at least minimal consumer protection.
Some SVCs can be used only for a single purpose; they can be used
to purchase goods or services from only one vendor. Examples
include fare cards9 used by many metropolitan transit systems and
phone cards"0 that can be used in pay phones. Other SVCs are
multi-purpose cards that can be used to purchase goods or services
from more than one vendor." Examples include the cards issued
at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta that could be used as fare cards and
to buy items at stores in Olympic venues. After the Olympics, the
cards could be used at businesses such as Texaco, Domino's Pizza,
Baskin Robbins, and Blimpie. 2  Banks issue some cards, 13 and
nonfinancial institutions issue others. 4 Still others are issued by
banks in conjunction with Visa.'5
These cards usually include the names of both the bank and the
company associated with credit cards.16 Some of the cards issued by
banks access the customer's deposit account at that bank.'7  Others
sold by banks can be bought at the bank by anyone who pays in
7. See infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text (discussing various features that distinguish
SVCs from traditional credit and debit cards).
8. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,698 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R- pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996); see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (noting
that FDIG believes one type of SVC to be similar to debit cards).
9. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698; see also David Goldberg, MARTA Plans Test of Cash Card,
ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Oct. 24, 1995, atA1 (discussingAtlanta's intention to introduce SVCs into
transit system).
10. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698; see also Angela G. King, Prepaid Phone Cards' Popularity Rises,
ATLANTAJ. & CoNsT., Aug. 25, 1996, at H6 (describing growth of prepaid phone card industry).
11. See61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698.
12. See Advertisement, AANTAJ. & CONST., Sept. 18, 1996, at E5.
13. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698.
14. See id.; see also Valerie Block, Phone Alliance May Rival Banks in Electronic Cash, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 23, 1996, at 10 [hereinafter Block, Phone Alliance] (discussing phone companies'
attempt to challenge bank domination of SVC industry); Valerie Block, Amex Testing Its First
Smart Card, with American Airlines, Am. BANKER, Oct. 17, 1996, at 17 [hereinafter Block, Amex
Testing] (detailing plans to expand SVC use at airports); King, supra note 10, at H6 (describing
growth of prepaid phone card industry).
15. See Patti Bond, Cash Cards Off to a Slow Start, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 2, 1996, at D1
(noting credit card industry's interest in SVCs); see also Parker, supra note 6, at 3 (describing
Visa's version of stored value card).
16. SeeAdvertisement for First Union Visa Cash Card, ATIANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 22, 1996,
at C1.
17. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698.
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advance, and are not linked to funds in the purchaser's deposit
account"'8 Some cards are "reloadable"-the cardholder can transfer
additional value to the SVC continually;19 others are disposable, and
cannot be reloaded." Reloadable cards can be replenished at
automated teller machines ("ATM"),21 specially designed tele-
phones,22 or personal computers.23  Although some cards can be
used only as SVCs, others also can be used as ATM, debit, and/or
credit cards.24 Under one SVC system, consumers are not confined
to transferring value from themselves to merchants from whom they
are buying goods or services; they can transfer value from themselves
to another private individual as a gift, a loan, or even to purchase
goods at a neighbor's garage sale.25
The results of a survey detailing consumer understanding of SVCs
suggest that this diversity will confuse SVC users.26 Consumers in
Atlanta were questioned about the SVC marketed prior to and during
the Olympics.27 Only one type of SVC was offered: a multipurpose
card sold by banks. The card was advertised heavily in Atlanta
newspapers for two months. 8 Although seventy percent of those
questioned were aware of the cards, eighty percent were confused
about how they worked, and only twelve percent understood how the
cards differed from other payment devices.29 It is reasonable to
assume that consumer confusion would be even greater if consumers
were exposed to several different types of SVCs.
Despite the tremendous diversity of SVC systems, different types of
SVCs look very much alike and appear similar to other types of
payment devices. They are made of the same type of material and are
18. Seeid. at 19,698-99; Advertisement for First Union Visa Cash Card, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
Apr. 14, 1996, at B5.
19. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698.
20. See id.
21. See id.; Kelly Greene, NationsBank Puts Lock on Venue Cash, ATLANTA Bus. CHRON., May
17, 1996, at 1.
22. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698; Deidre Sullivan, Smart Cards May Load "Cash" at Home, Form
& Function: Where Does the ATM Go from Here, AM. BANKER Supp., Nov. 27, 1995, at 10A
(detailing European system that allows cash access by phone).
23. See Prepaid Cards Could Dry Up Source of Treasury Income, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 1995, at
7.
24. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698.
25. See id.;Jeffrey Kuder & Valerie Block, Mondex Gains U.S. Foothold with Smart Card Test at
Wells, AM. BANKER, Aug. 3, 1995, at 15 (describing various uses for SVC). See generally David B.
Lipkin, Stored Value Systems, in COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 11 (American Bar
Ass'n ed., 1996).
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exactly the same size as credit, debit, and ATM cards. This is
necessary because many SVCs also serve as other types of payment
devices. Consumers often must insert these cards into card readers,
ATMs, and other equipment that are designed to accommodate only
cards of a certain size. SVCs issued by or in conjunction with Visa
bear the Visa logo. This similarity of function and appearance adds
to the potential for consumer confusion.
Despite looking alike on the surface, the architecture of various
SVC systems differ substantially. Moreover, under proposed amend-
ments to Regulation E published by the FRB,3° the availability of
federal protection for consumers depends on the type of architecture
their SVC employs.31 Some SVCs operate "on-line." This means that
"when the card is used at an ATM or POS [point of sale] terminal,
the transaction is authorized by means of on-line communication with
the data facility, where the transaction data are stored.., the balance
information is maintained in the data facility." 2 The Federal
Reserve has characterized these SVCs as "the functional equivalent of
using a debit card to access a traditional deposit account. 3 3 Other
SVC systems operate off-line, with information concerning the balance
of funds available recorded both on the card and at a central data
facility.3 4 In other off-line systems, the balance of funds data is
contained only on the card; there is no central database. 3
It is important to note that even if consumers understood the
distinct ways in which SVCs operated, they would have to inquire
further to determine which architecture was employed in the design
of any particular card they use; there is nothing on the face of the
cards themselves to inform the consumer.3 6 Consumers who go to
a bank to buy SVCs may be able to obtain this information from a
bank employee. It is unclear, however, how a consumer could obtain
this information if buying an SVC from a vending machine, an ATM,
or a convenience store. Moreover, consumers will not incur the
transaction costs of making this determination unless they realize it
is relevant.
30. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,696.
31. See id. at 19,698.
32. IX. at 19,699.
33. Id.; see also Valerie Block, Bank of Hawaii Cash Card TargetsJapanese Vruitors, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 16, 1996, at 16 (stating that prepaid cash card operates like bank debit card).
34. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,699.
35. See id.
36. Copies of the information printed on the cards issued by First Union, Wachovia, and
NationsBank are on file with The American University Law Review.
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The proposed amendment to Regulation E would not provide
consumers with the information they need to determine what type of
card they have nor would it inform them of the risks they take in
using various cards because of their different architectures. Regula-
tion E addresses only a limited range of issues.37 Thus, even
consumers who know how SVCs work and who understand how
various types of SVC systems are treated under Regulation E may not
understand what legal characteristics, including risks and protections,
the cards may embody.
In accord with the FRB, the FDIC has acknowledged that one type
of SVC is "similar to [a] debit card[]."' This raises the question of
whether other types of SVCs are similar to something else. In
requesting comments on SVC technology, the FDIC has noted SVCs'
"similarity to cashier's checks, money orders, and traveler's checks."3 9
Each of these three types of payment devices has special characteris-
tics and significantly different legal consequences,' depending on
whether the state whose law applies has adopted the revised Article 3
and amended Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."). 41 Moreover, some states have imposed additional non-
U.C.C. requirements on businesses that sell travelers' checks and
money orders.42 Thus, even sophisticated, well-informed consumers
will be confused and ignorant of basic rights and responsibilities
associated with SVCs unless extensive consumer disclosure and
education occurs.
Currently, the manner in which SVCs are marketed fosters
consumer confusion. One advertisement that has appeared several
times in Atlanta proclaims in large boldface type: "Cash is Good.
This is Better." The text then states: "It's a prepaid cash card you'll
be able to use just like cash-only it's better! It's fast, accurate and
convenient. It eliminates waiting for approval in the checkout line
... entering a PIN number.., signing receipts ... carrying loose
37. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1996) (addressing issuance, liability for unauthorized transfers,
disclosure, and procedures for resolving errors). Under the proposed amendment to Regulation
E, most of the Regulation E provisions that apply to these issuse will be made inapplicable to
most types of SVCs. See infra notes 122-83 and accompanying text.
38. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; StoredValue Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,40,490
n.1 (1996).
39. Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,40,496
(1996).
40. See U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 4 (1995).
41. See FRED H. MILLER & ALviN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND
NOTES 1-10 to 1-11 (2d ed. 1992).
42. See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text (identifying state statutes that require
businesses to obtain licenses and make disclosures to customers).
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coins or not having exact change."4" The advertisement seeks to
gain consumer acceptance of SVCs as a cash substitute. Yet, after
asserting SVC's superiority to cash, the advertisement supports its
claim through illustrations that have nothing to do with paying with
cash. Rather, the ad suggests a distinction between SVCs and checks,
which need approval, and debit cards, which require the user to enter
a PIN.
Although it is true, as the ad states, that SVCs have the advantage
over cash of eliminating loose coins or the need for exact change at
facilities that accept SVCs, the system is not necessarily better than
cash. For example, unlike payment by check and credit card, a third
party gets the "float," not the consumer.' Additionally, some cards
carry an expiration date, and the issuer keeps the value if the card is
not used by that date.' The SVC offered by NationsBank during the
Olympics, for example, provided that any unused balance would be
donated to an Olympic charity chosen by the bank.46  It is reason-
able to expect that as is the case with traveler's checks, consumers will
not use all of the value on their cards, forfeiting that value to the card
issuers. This forfeiture is especially likely in situations like the
Olympics, in which issuers market the cards as collector's items.47
Even without a special event, however, some consumers will purchase
SVCs for reasons other than redeeming their stored value. Telephone
cards in Israel, for example, have become desirable pieces to
collect.4'
Unlike cash, consumers pay a fee to use some SVCs and risk
absorbing the costs of malfunctions. 49  Although merchants accept-
43. Advertisement, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,June 25, 1996, at A7.
44. See Valerie Block, Blockbuster Running Test of a Stored Value Card, AM. BANKER, Sept. 1,
1995, at 11; Mickey Higginbotham, Banks Scramble to Sign up Lucrative Cash Card Accounts,
ATLANTAJ. & CONSr., Nov. 17, 1995, at H2.
45. See Block, supra note 44, at 11.
46. The agreement (on file with The American University Law Review) further provides that
"NationsBank will transfer such funds promptly after expiration on your behalf, subject to a fee
of up to $5.00 per Card."
47. Wachovia, for example, advertises that its Visa Cash Card dedicated to the Olympic
athlete is "destined to become a collector's item." A copy of the brochure describing the card
is on file with The American University Law Review.
48. SeeJudy Siegel, Telecard Collectors to ConVeeJERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 2, 1995, at 2 (noting
that collectors appraised one of first cards issued in country at $3000). See generally MCI to
Provide Prepaid Phone Cards and Services to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 25, 1996;
NationsBank Sets up Card Collector Servce AM. BANKER, Nov. 27, 1996, at 11.
49. See Ellen Stark, Here's Wat You Should Know Before Making Electronic Payments, BUFF.
NEwS, Jan. 27, 1997, at C2 (cautioning consumers that card issuers may not be required to
replace malfunctioning SVCs); see alsoBlock, supranote 33, at 16 (noting that Cash Card charges
consumers $19 fee); Valerie Block, Canadian Banks to Test Belian Stored Value System in Ontario
College Town, AM. BANKER, June 28, 1996, at 10 [hereinafter Block, Canadian Banks) (describing
annual fee range of $6 to $12); Valerie Block, Smart Cards off to a Bumpy Start, Critics Say, AM.
1034
STORED VALUE CARDS AND THE CONSUMER
ing SVCs save money by lowering their risk of cash miscounting and
the costs of storage and delivery, merchants pay a fee every time SVCs
are used in their stores.5" If this fee exceeds savings from the
decreased need for cash, merchants likely will pass this cost along to
all consumers. In addition, a defect in the card may deprive
consumers of the value they pay for the cards. The president of
Echelon Industries estimates that one of every thousand smart cards
does not work properly."' Computer scientists at Bell Communi-
cations Research have reported that a flaw in many types of cards
used in Europe makes it possible to produce counterfeit cards.52
SVCs also present consumers with the risk of invasions of privacy
53
that are not present when cash is used. Moreover, if the issuer
becomes insolvent as have several issuers of prepaid phone cards,
sellers of goods and services will stop honoring SVCs, and consumers
may not be able to collect the value remaining on the card even if the
issuer is a bank whose deposits generally are FDIC insured. 4 In
addition, merchants who have not been paid by the issuer may
demand payment from consumers for purchases made with the
SVC.15  Consumers who accede to this demand will pay twice unless
they can collect from the issuer. Finally, when consumers pay with
cash, they easily can count how much money they have left. With
most SVCs, the consumer must go to a store with a card reader to
learn how much value remains on the card.
BANKER, Jan. 17, 1996, at 14 (noting that consumers must pay for cards). But see James B.
Arndorfer, Prepaid Telephone Cards Aren't Exactly Ringing Bells at the Country's Groups, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 13 (detailing practice of many credit unions giving consumers free cards for
promotional purposes).
50. See Higginbotham, supra note 44, at H2; Mickey Higginbotham, Smart Cards: Bank
Delivers on Domino's Cashless Goal ATLANTAJ., Nov. 15, 1995, at E2 (explaining that First Union
Bank charges one percent plus two cents for each transaction).
51. See Valerie Block, Bridge Sought Between Transit Smart Cards, AM. BANKER, July 25, 1995,
at 19.
52. SeeJohn Markoff, Potential Flaw in Cash Card Security Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at
D1.
53. See Steven A Bercu, Smart Card Technologies: Novel Privay Concerns and the Legal Response,
10 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2,3 (1995); Bill McConnell, No Need Yet to Regulate Electronic Cash, Fed's
Vice Chairman Tells Banking Pane AM. BANKER, Oct. 12, 1995, at 1, 2.
54. FDIC insurance applies only to funds that remain credited to the consumer's account
"until claims on such funds are made by payees." FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8;
Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490, 40,492 (1996). Several issuers of pre-paid phone cards
have gone out of business after selling tens of thousands of worthless SVCs. See Carol Angrisani,
Group Reports Several Chains Got Nonworking Phone Cards, SUPERMARKT NEwvs, Apr. 22, 1996, at
92;Judy Corcoran, Wrong Numbers: Prepaid Phone Card Industry OfferingLimited Returns to Retailers,
SUPERiARKEr NEWs,July 15, 1996, at 47; Gautum Naik, Sony, Your Prepaid Phone Card Has Been
Deactivated, WALL ST.J.,July 16, 1996 at B1; Noreen Seebacher, Prepaid Calling Cards May Not Be
Smartest Way to Stay in Touch, DET. NEWS, Nov. 14, 1996, at F5.
55. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,492.
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Some SVC advertisements stop short of claiming that SVCs are
better than cash, instead touting them as equal to cash, but more
convenient. Some cards are advertised as "Visa Cash"56 or the "Cash
Card."57  The president of one of the banks promoting SVCs in
Atlanta stated, "It's the same as cash, only you won't have to fish for
change or smooth out wrinkles in a dollar bill to get a candy bar."
58
SVCs, however, are not the same as cash. In addition to potential
problems with fees, malfunctions, privacy, and solvency, SVCs are not
legal tender. 9
The manner in which SVCs are being marketed indicates that less
sophisticated consumers are among the targeted groups. For
example, SVCs have become the first non-cash payment systems
encountered by many freshmen who enroll in a growing number of
universities that have implemented smart card applications.' In
addition, many SVCs are available to people who do not have bank
accounts.6" This may make SVCs attractive to low-income consumers,
who often are unbanked.62 Many SVC plans offer cards in small
denominations, such as those not exceeding $100. These low
denomination cards make SVCs affordable to consumers with modest
incomes. Finally, SVCs are being marketed for the purchase of goods
and services, such as mass transit fares.63 These services commonly
are used by those with lower incomes.
Even well-informed and more sophisticated consumers can be
confused by SVCs. This should be a significant factor in the
56. Advertisement, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Sept. 18, 1996, at E5.
57. Advertisement, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 8, 1996, at El.
58. Rodney Ho, First Union Plans Launch of "Smart Cards"for Purchases, ATLANTAJ., Mar. 21,
1995, at D1 (quoting David Caroll, President, F'rSt Union Bank of Georgia).
59. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,490 n.2 (explaining that information loaded on SVCs is not legal
tender but constitutes right to be paid sum of money).
60. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,698 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996); see also Block, Canadian Banks, supra note 49, at 10;
Valerie Block, HuntingtonJoins Sallie Mae in Smart Card VentureAM. BANKER, Apr. 26, 1996, at 11;
Beth Piskora, Texas Students Using Diebold's Combined Debit-ID Card, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 1995;
Jeremy Quittner, B of A Card Lets Students Open Doors, Accounts, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 1996, at 14.
61. See, e.g., First Union advertisement, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Apr. 14, 1996, at B5.
62. See Glenn B. Canner & Ellen Maland, Basic Banking, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 255, 257
(1987). See generally EDWARD L RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES,
MATERIALS AND ISSUES 228-42 (2d ed. 1994). The National Consumer Law Center filed
comments on the FRB's proposed amendments to Regulation E that stressed the potential
importance of stored value cards to Iow%-income consumers. See Comments of the National
Consumer Law Center on the Proposed Amendments to Regulation E (Sept. 5, 1996) (on file
with The American University Law Review). Phone SVCs have been popular with lowest income
consumers, with consumers in ethnic neighborhoods with many individuals from foreign
countries, and with individuals who do not have regular phone service. Corcoran, supra note
54, at 47; Noreen Seebacher, Calles Beware: Some Firms' Prepaid Phone Cards in Troube, DET.
NEws, Apr. 10, 1996, atJ4.
63. See Higginbotham, supra note 44, at H2.
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formation of public policy. Public confidence in payment systems
used by banks is essential to the soundness of the banking system.'
John S. Reed, the Chairman of Citicorp, stated that successful
electronic banking "is not a question of economics or efficiency. It
is a question of trust. The consumer will have to trust you."6
Reflecting on the presentations and discussions made at a September
1996 conference on electronic money, Comptroller of the Currency
Eugene A. Ludwig said, "Perhaps the most significant [theme] is the
importance of trust .... [E]veryone agreed trust is the key to
developing a robust e-money system."66 It is doubtful that consumers
will have confidence in a system about which there is such fundamen-
tal ignorance and confusion. Laws requiring minimal disclosure can
ameliorate this problem, but they are not a panacea.6 ' The FDIC
relates the need for regulation directly to reasonable consumer
expectations.' Due to the diversity of SVC systems, however, it may
be difficult to gauge consumer expectations. Moreover, consumers
reasonably may believe SVCs carry the same protections as credit or
debit cards.69 This misconception indicates the need for uniform
regulation, to the extent possible, regardless of the architecture of the
various SVC systems.7°
64. See Stored Value Cards and other Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,40,496 (1996).
"As a result of the potential widespread use of such [stored value] systems, it may be that the
FDIC should determine that public confidence in these payment systems is critical to the safety
and soundness of the banking system, such that deposit insurance is warranted." Id.
65. Jeffrey Kuter, Reed: Ted Revolution Won't Occur Overnight, Am. BANKER, Sept. 20, 1996,
at 1-2.
66. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller Trus4 Reliability Essential to Electronic Money, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 4.
67. The FDIC "staff would expect the relationship between a stored value card customer
and the institution to be clearly and conspicuously stated." 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496. In addition,
the FDIC expects issuers to disclose, when applicable, that funds in the card are not insured by
the FDIC. See id For discussion of the problems attendant to implementing disclosures, see
infra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
68. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496. "The failure to provide deposit insurance in an instance
where protection is reasonably expected by a consumer could, in the event of failure of an
issuer, result in a loss of public confidence in these developing payment mechanisms." Id. The
FDIC should take into consideration whether reasonable consumers "may be more likely to
believe that a reloadable card gives rise to an insured deposit." Id.
69. SVCs look similar to credit and debit cards. Furthermore, some SVCs are functionally
similar to debit cards and, in some systems, occupy the same card as credit and debit cards.
70. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing architecture of various SVC
systems).
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II. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Application of Regulation E
1. The ERB's broad assertion of authority
Regulation E, promulgated pursuant to the Electronic Fund
Transfers Act ("EFTA"), addresses many of the legal issues that arise
when consumers use SVCs.7 In May 1996, the FRB published
proposed amendments to Regulation E to accommodate SVC
systems.72 In October 1996, as part of an appropriations package,
Congress ordered the FRB to conduct a study to determine whether
the EFTA could be applied to such systems without having an adverse
impact on the cost, development, and operation of SVCs.73 The Act
required the Board to issue a report to Congress within six months of
its effective date.74 The legislation postpones the effective date of
any final Board amendments to regulate SVCs under the EFTA.7"
This period lasts until the later of: (1) three months after the FRB
submits its report; or (2) nine months after enactment.76 Despite
the postponement of any final rule, it is informative to examine the
FRB proposal, as it illustrates the problematic nature of SVC systems
resulting from their diversity of architecture and their similarity to
other types of payment devices.
The proposed amendments seek to address a wide range of SVC
systems. This is significant because they require the FRB to interpret
the EFTA in a broad fashion. This reflects the FRB's acknowledge-
ment that SVCs will form an important payment system and its
determination to play a crucial role in this emerging system. The
EFTA defines the term "account" as "a demand deposit, savings
deposit, or other asset account."77 This does not seem to apply to
SVCs issued by nonfinancial institutions, or to SVCs that consumers
can purchase over-the-counter from financial institutions atwhich they
71. Such issues include initial disclosure to the consumer of the terms and liabilities
associated with SVCs, the necessity of providing periodic statements and receipts, and the
procedures available for resolving claims of error.
72. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,700-01 (1996) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
73. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2601, 1996 U.S.C.C.N.




77. Electronic Fund Transfers Act of 1978 § 903, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a) (2) (1994).
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have no account. This is important because a substantial number of
systems are operated by nonbanks.78 Thus, if the FRB lacked the
authority to regulate SVCs issued by nonbanks, it could not effectively
regulate SVC commerce. Moreover, banks are selling SVCs to
consumers who have no account relationship with them.
7 9
The EFTA provides, however, that the FRB can issue regulations
covering electronic fund transfers ("EFT") services provided by
persons other than financial institutions."° Pursuant to this provi-
sion, the FRB has asserted its authority to apply the EFTA to money
market accounts and to other securities accounts held by broker-
dealers, as well as to accounts held by the government to distribute
government benefits.8
The EFTA also contains a catch-all provision allowing the FRB to
issue regulations that "contain such classifications, differentiations, or
other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and excep-
tions.., as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to
effectuate the purposes [of the EFTA]. "82 Finally, the FRB could
point to language in the legislative history indicating Congress' intent
for the EFTA to have broad coverage. 3 Most significantly for
consumers, the Senate Banking Committee stated that the EFTA
defined "financial institution" and "account" broadly "so as to assure
that all persons who offer equivalent EFT services involving any type
of asset account are subject to the same standards and consumers
owning such accounts are assured of uniform protection."4
78. See Block, Phone Allianc supra note 14, at 10 (describing alliance of phone companies
that utilize SVC cards); Block, Amex Testing, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing possibility of
electronic airline ticketing); Scott D. Smith, Fed Exec: Regulation Unlikely for Nonbank Payment
Finns, Am. BANKER, May 28, 1996, at 2 (discussing payment systems in which service provider is
not responsible for deposits). Alton Gilbert, Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank in St.
Louis, predicted that "eventually 20% of payment services could take place outside the banking
industry." I.
79. See supra text accompanying note 18.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d) (providing that FRB "shall" regulate electronic fund transfer
services offered by non-financial institutions as necessary to protect consumers).
81. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,699 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996) (stating that EFTA definition of asset accounts, which
FRB has authority to regulate, includes money-market mutual funds, other broker-dealer held
securities accounts, and government-established electronic benefit transfer programs).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(c); see also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 371
(1973) (finding that FRB possessed broad rule-making authority under Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1604, to prevent merchant evasion of reporting requirements through concealment
of credit charges, although specific remedial measure was not authorized explicitly under
statute). See generally Expedited Funds Availability Act § 611, 12 U.S.C. § 4010(f) (1994) ("The
Board is authorized to impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and
liability in connection with any aspect of the payment system... .") (emphasis added).
83. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,699 (discussing Senate Banking Committee's endorsement of
liberal interpretation of EFTA).
84. Id (emphasis added).
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2. The FRB's categorization of stored value systems in its proposed rule
To understand the proposed rule for SVCs, it is necessary to
understand how the FRB has characterized SVC systems. Like Julius
Caesar in Gaul, the FRB has divided all SVCs into three parts for
purposes of the proposed rule. 5 The FRB calls one system "on-line."
In this system, "data about individual card balances and transactions
... are collected and maintained at centralized locations; and the
value associated with a card is limited to an amount that the consum-
er chooses, not a fluctuating balance in the consumer's checking or
savings account." 6 As the FRB acknowledges, "in some respects" this
system "resembles off-line accountable stored value systems, and in
others resembles traditional deposit accounts accessed by debit
cards."" Although operating on-line, "[t]he balance of funds
available to the consumer is not recorded on the card itself, as in off-
line stored value systems."88 With regard to certain system features,
this type of SVC "is the functional equivalent of a deposit account
accessed by a debit card." 9 The proposed rule generally subjects
this SVC system to Regulation E.90
A second system is called "off-line accountable." The FRB describes
the system as follows:
The systems operate off-line; there is no authorization of transac-
tions by communication with a database .... Transaction data are
periodically transmitted to and maintained by a data facility. As in
the case of the traditional consumer deposit account accessed by a
debit card, in these stored value card systems a consumer has the
right to draw upon funds held by an institution. 91
The Board concluded that these off-line accountable cards function
in a way that "strongly parallels" that of a deposit account.92 The
proposed rule, however, does not apply significant parts of Regulation
E.93
85. See id. (delineating SVC systems as either "off-line accountable stored value systems,"
off-line unaccountable stored value systems," or "on-line stored value systems").
86. Id. at 19,702.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id. The FRB found that on-line SVCs are the functional equivalent of a deposit account
accessed by a debit card because in both "the transaction is authorized by means of on-line
communication with a financial institution or central data facility." Id.
90. See id. at 19,703 (proposing exemption of on-line SVC from Regulation E if SVG is
limited to $100).
91. Id. at 19,699.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 19,699-700 (explaining provisions of Regulation E that are not applicable to
off-line accountable systems).
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The third system is characterized as "off-line unaccountable." 4
The FRB states:
[T]he record of value is maintained only on the card itself, and not
in a central database. Transaction data for debits to the card's
"stored value" are recorded on the card .... Given the lack of a
centrally maintained, ongoing record of individual card balances or
of transaction data in these systems, it is more difficult to conclude
that an "account" exists for purposes of Regulation E.95
At the present time, most of these types of SVC systems are sold for
small amounts and are used for only one type of purchase. Common
examples of off-line unaccountable cards are fare cards and cards sold
at photocopy stores.96  As the Board acknowledged, however,
nothing in this system's architecture would prevent it from handling
large amounts or from being used as a multiple purpose card
system. The Board concluded that multiple purpose, large denomi-
nation, off-line unaccountable cards are "comparable to traditional
debit cards ... in terms of potential uses by consumers." 8
There are several notable aspects to the FRB's discussion of the
three systems. For example, the Board admits that in various respects,
all three systems resemble the "traditional debit cards" that were
Congress' principal concern when it enacted the EFTA, and for which
Regulation E specifically was drafted.99 Because of this similarity,
reasonable consumers likely would expect Regulation E to apply
regardless of which type of SVC they purchase. The proposed
amendment, however, excludes many SVCs from coverage under
Regulation E based on features in SVC systems"t ° that are complete-
ly unknown, and probably unknowable, to consumers.' 10
94. See id. at 19,699.
95. Id.




100. These differentiated features include determinations of whether a system is off-line or
on-line, and if off-line, whether it is accountable or unaccountable.
101. See Parker, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that consumers find no meaningful distinction
between accountable and unaccountable cards). The American Bankers Association submitted
a letter in response to the FRB's request for comments in which it stated: "[Clonsumers will
be oblivious to the operational distinctions; regulatory protections and disclosures that vary
substantially according to the card's architecture rather than their function will cause consumer
confusion. The focus should be on how the card is used, not on its technological attributes."
Letter from Nessa Eileen Feddis, Senior Federal Counsel, American Bankers Ass'n, to William
W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 5 (Sept. 6, 1996) (on file
with The Amerian University Law Review).
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As the FDIC has stated, public trust in a payment system is
essential. 2 The public cannot trust a system that it does not
understand. The public also cannot rely on regulations based on
system characteristics about which they have no knowledge. Because
they lack knowledge about the various SVC systems, consumers will
make decisions based on their expectations. But the similarity of
SVCs to debit cards likely will cause consumers to assume that the law
affords the same legal protections to SVC users as it does to debit
card users. 3 When problems occur, those consumers who are not
using on-line cards will learn they have little or no protection. As a
result, their trust will evaporate and even may lead to distrust of other
similar payment systems."°
Given this confusion-laden situation, there are four possible
solutions regarding consumer use of SVCs. First, consumers might
use SVCs even though they do not know the risks to which they might
be exposed, or may have false expectations regarding those risks.
These consumers likely will be those who are ignorant of the risks,
those who confine their SVC purchases to low denomination cards
and occasional use, and risk seekers. Such a limited market would
stifle development of SVCs and might make them unprofitable.
Second, the government could rely on industry to educate
consumers. The advertising campaign in Atlanta, however, demon-
strates that this reliance would be unwarranted. 5 Industry cannot
be expected to spend money to point out the risks and drawbacks of
SVCs. Additionally, consumers cannot realistically be expected to rely
on industry to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of SVCs
in comparison to other types of payment devices.
Third, the government could rely on private initiatives. Under this
scenario, some consumers may incur the transaction costs to educate
themselves about SVCs. In addition, the media may educate
consumers about SVCs, and consumer organizations may be willing to
allocate scarce resources to this effort. It seems unwise, however, to
rest the public trust on such a slim reed. This is true particularly
because relying on non-governmental sources makes it impossible to
102. See Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,
40,496 (1996) (discussing whether FDIG should insure SVCs to maintain public confidence).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 43-47, 56.
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ensure that consumers are provided accurate, uniform, and consistent
information. 106
Fourth, the government could mandate disclosures and basic
protections to help ensure public trust in SVCs specifically and
electronic payment systems generally.
Another significant feature of the Board's discussion of these
systems is its suggestion of alternative ways to classify SVCs. One
option would be to distinguish cards based on whether they have a
single use, such as a fare card, or multiple uses.1 7 The advantage
of making Regulation E coverage depend on this factor is the ease
with which industry and consumers could understand such a
classification. This type of differentiation also would be easy for the
FRB to administer. The Board, however, did not adopt this option in
its proposed rule. 8 It may have rejected this choice because it
wanted to bring single purpose cards that can carry substantial
amounts of value into the confines of Regulation E. The Board also
may have believed that it had found another way to accomplish the
same objective.
The proposed rule exempts from coverage all SVCs that cannot
carry more than $100 at one time.1" This includes both on-line
and off-line cards, as well as most single purpose and many multiple
purpose cards.1 The FRB justified this exemption by claiming that
$100 is "a relatively small amount of funds," and stated that because
the amount at risk is "sufficiently minimal," "application of even
modified Regulation E protections appears unnecessary.""' It
characterized the $100 amount as "de minimis."112
Despite the FRB's superior access to economic information, the
FRB presented no data in its request for comment to support its asser-
tion.' On its face, the FRB claim appears unwarranted. One
hundred dollars presumably is a great deal of money for a person who
is unemployed, or earning minimum wage and working part-time, or
even full-time. The Board apparently ignored those who live from
paycheck to paycheck. A loss of $100 can mean the inability to pay
106. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,700 (196) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996) (discussing ways in which SVG providers may target and
bring possible harm to consumers).
107. See id. at 19,702.
108. See id. (proposing that Regulation E exclude offline unaccountable systems from
regulation).
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the rent or pay a mechanic to repair a rundown vehicle that a
consumer needs to get to work. One hundred dollars is not de
minimis to a college student on a limited budget who has incurred
large loans."1 Perhaps the explanation is that the Board assumed
these segments of the consumer population would not purchase SVCs.
This assumption is unwarranted; the cards are targeted at persons who
are in these demographic groups."' Increasing rates of credit
delinquency and personal bankruptcy indicate that many consumers
are having difficulty making ends meet.116  One hundred dollars
appears to be more de minimis to the industry marketing the cards
than to the consumers using them.
The rationale behind the $100 exemption is flawed because
reloadable cards would be included in the exemption."' Under the
proposed regulation, online and offline accountable cards that are
capable of carrying $101 would be subject to regulation requiring
basic disclosures, but the same types of cards that could be reloaded
constantly, although carrying no more than $100 at a time, would be
completely exempt. It is not apparent why the person who uses a
reloadable card to transfer thousands of dollars has less need for
disclosure than the consumer who purchases a $101 disposable card.
Instead, it would seem that the need for basic information concerning
rights, obligations, and risk of loss would be the same for either
consumer.
Moreover, consumers may purchase several cards, none carrying
more than $100, but in total representing many hundreds or
thousands of dollars in value.1 This tendency may provide an
incentive for the industry to market only $100 cards as a means of
avoiding regulation. Traditional marketing factors and consumer
choice, not industry attempts to avoid regulation, should determine
the types of SVCs used.
114. Cf Antoinette Coulton, Easy Creditfor Students Teaching Hard Lessons, AM. BANKER, Oct.
17, 1996, at 16 (noting that rising education and living costs have forced students to rely on
credit cards, but more student cardholders are paying late or not at all).
115. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
116. See Hope Viner Samborn, Going for Broke: Soaring Bankruptcies Prompt CaUs for New
Repayment Plan, A.BAJ., Sept. 1996, at 16; see also Saul Hansell, Bankruptcies Surging as Economy
Hums, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1996, § 1, at 2.
117. The $100 exemption covers SVCs that are capable of holding a maximum of $100 "at
a given time." 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701. The exemption therefore applies to cards that can hold
no more than $100 at any one time but that can be reloaded.
118. See Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,
40,496-97 (1996) (stating that FDIC will consider fact that consumers may hold multiple cards
of $100 value in deciding whether to treat such cards as deposit).
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The proposed SVC rule, in addition to exempting cards that can
carry no more than $100, would completely exempt offline unac-
countable cards." 9 The Board appears to be unsure whether it has
the authority to regulate these cards. In its request for comment on
the proposed SVC rule, the FRB states: "Given this lack of a centrally
maintained, ongoing record of individual card balances or of
transaction data in these systems, it is more difficult to conclude that
an 'account' exists for purposes of Regulation E." 2' Elsewhere in
the comment, however, the Board encourages feedback as to whether
it should include limited coverage of this system.' Consumers
have no feasible way of knowing if a card is off-line unaccountable
and also are unaware of any reason to discover if it is. Moreover, in
important respects these cards resemble debit cards that are governed
by Regulation E. For these reasons, as well as for those discussed in
Part II.D, exempting off-line unaccountable cards completely is bad
policy. If the FRB lacks legal authority to regulate off-line unaccount-
able cards because there is no "account" within the definition of the
EFTA, the Board should seek a legislative amendment to the EFTA to
broaden the definition to include this system.
3. Regulation E provisions to protect consumers
a. Initial disclosures
Congress recognized that EFT transactions have "unique character-
istics."122 Because EFT is a new way for consumers to handle their
money, Congress felt that it was vital for consumers to be informed
of the essential elements of EFT transactions, as well as of their rights
and obligations.' Both the EFTA and Regulation E, therefore,
require issuers to make various initial disclosures of terms and
conditions of the EFT service. These disclosures include: (1) the
consumer's liability for unauthorized transfers; (2) any charges for
services; (3) the consumer's right to receive documentation such as
receipts at ATMs and periodic statements; (4) the consumer's right
to stop payment of preauthorized transfers; (5) the circumstances
under which the financial institution will disclose information about
the consumer's account to third parties; and (6) information about
119. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701.
120. I&
121. See id. at 19,702.
122. Electronic Fund Transfers Act of 1978 § 902(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a) (1994).
123. See id.
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the institution's error resolution procedures, including the telephone
number and address to which the consumer should report errors.
24
These disclosures ensure that consumers will have the basic informa-
tion they require in order to decide whether to transfer their money
via EFT. They also will allow the consumer to understand better his
rights and obligations, as well as how to protect himself when
problems arise.
The EFTA scheme is consistent with other federal consumer
protection legislation mandating disclosure, such as the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act," the Truth in Lending Act,126 and the Truth
in Savings Act.1 27 The FRB's proposed SVC rule, however, exempts
from these initial disclosure requirements all transactions involving
SVCs that are categorized as "off-line unaccountable.' 2  The
proposed SVC rule also exempts those SVCs that are capable of
carrying $100 or less in value, 29 regardless of whether they can be
reloaded continually. Despite these exemptions, certain disclosures
still would be required for on-line and off-line accountable sys-
tems."s Because consumers of all types of SVCs would benefit from
disclosure of basic information, the Board should not exempt any type
of SVC from initial disclosure.
The Board's conclusions on whether to require initial disclosures
are based on a rather rough cost-benefit analysis: "Providing initial
disclosures probably would not impose significant compliance costs.
The disclosures can be given along with the card or with other
account-opening material in a preprinted format; they need not be
individually customized for each account."'' The Board, however,
points to no evidence that the costs of initial disclosure to issuers of
off-line unaccountable cards would be higher than the insignificant
costs to issuers of the types of cards that would be subject to the
regulation. The FRB's justification, apparently, is that most current
off-line unaccountable cards are sold in small amounts and for a
single purpose. 3 2  As the Board acknowledges, however, there is
124. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.7 (1996).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.
126. Id. §§ 1601-1920.
127. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313.
128. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,701 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 19,700. Required disclosures would include consumer liability for unautho-
rized transactions, the types of transfers available, transaction charges, and error resolution
procedures available, if any. See id.
131. Id.
132. See iU. at 19,701.
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nothing to prevent issuers from selling large amount, multi-purpose
off-line unaccountable cards.133 Moreover, the FRB itself suggests
that exempting a category of SVC from regulation may provide issuers
with the incentive to market that type of card rather than one subject
to regulation.1m
At the very least, consumers need to know some basic information:
the amount of any user fees; whether the issuer may change the terms
and conditions of the cards subsequent to consumer purchase; any
expiration date; consumer liability for lost, stolen, or malfunctioning
cards; how the consumer can ascertain the balance remaining in the
card; and whether and in what manner unused value can be
redeemed. In addition, the cards should inform the consumer of
whom to .call and where to go with questions or to seek assistance.
This will not necessarily be obvious; the cards issued in Atlanta, for
example, contain both the name "Visa" and the name of the bank
where they were purchased."l
The FRB's request for comment suggests that disclosures could be
included in material provided to consumers when they open an
account or even "along with the card."1 6 Presumably, "along with
the card" includes printing disclosures directly on the card. The
Wachovia card, for example, includes limited disclosures on the back
of the card." 7 To best achieve its purpose, disclosure should be
required at the time the consumer purchases the card; disclosures
made only when the consumer opens an account should not be
allowed. This is because consumers who opened accounts in 1996 will
not retain or remember disclosures given at that time when they buy
another card in 1998. Consumers using reloadable cards would be
best served by disclosures printed on the card itself. They are unlikely
to retain disclosures given at the time the card is purchased for the
many months or years they continue to reload and use the card. It
may be infeasible, however, to include all mandated disclosures as well
as other information the issuer wants to include on the card or in
printed material made available at the time of sale. An alternative
would be to require the card to contain a telephone number and
address from which the consumer could receive the disclosures.
133. See iid.
134. See id. at 19,702.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
136. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,700.
137. The card (copy on file with The American University Law Review) contains the following
disclosures: "Card value cannot be refunded or credited in the event the card is lost or stolen.
If you have any questions, including where to use your card, please call 1-800-922-4684."
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b. Notice of change of terms
Regulation E requires financial institutions to mail or deliver to the
consumer written notice of any change in the terms or conditions
covered by the initial disclosure requirement "if the change would
result in increased fees or charges, increased liability for the consum-
er, fewer types of available electronic fund transfers, or stricter
limitations on the frequency or dollar amounts of transfers."'" The
notice must be mailed or delivered at least twenty-one days before the
change is implemented.' 9 This required disclosure enables con-
sumers to decide whether to continue to use the EFT service affected
by the changes.
The proposed revision would not require financial institutions to
inform the consumer of changes in terms under any SVC system.'
41
The revision would allow provisions such as the one in the
NationsBank SVC agreement, which provides: "This agreement is
subject to amendment by NationsBank at any time without prior
notice . ."..," This revision would allow issuers to impose an
earlier expiration date on a card or to increase the fees imposed
without notice. Consumers buying SVCs thus would have no way of
knowing the true cost or the conditions of use for these cards. The
unfairness of the proposed revision in not requiring notice of a
change in terms is acknowledged in the request for comment which
admits that it would be unreasonable for issuers not to inform
consumers of an increase in fees. 42 The proposed exemptions from
disclosure are especially onerous because they allow issuers to keep
consumers ignorant of the fact that they will not be notified of any
changes in terms.
The better rule would be to prohibit issuers from changing terms
unless they provide notice. This would present issuers with formida-
ble obstacles if the issuer did not obtain the consumer's address. As
the request for comment acknowledges, however, most cards are likely
to be used within a short time, before any changes would take
effect.14' The request reasons that no notice should be required
because typically no changes would occur during the short time in
which the card is used." Consistent with the EFTA, however, the
138. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.8 (1996).
139. See id.
140. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,700.
141. A copy of the NationsBank agreement is on file with The American University Law Review.
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fact that such changes rarely occur should weigh in favor of mandat-
ing notice. Issuers would not face an undue burden under such a
requirement because they seldom change the terms during this brief
period. If the issuer really believes that it may need to change terms
while the consumer has the card, it should take the precaution of
obtaining the consumer's address. In the case of freely transferable
cards, the issuer should be required to notify only the initial purchas-
er of the card of changes in terms. Similarly, notice would be
unnecessary when changes in terms are not contemplated. If, in fact,
consumers are likely to use cards within relatively brief periods, then
an issuer's need to alter terms presumably will be minimal. Accord-
ingly, the "burden" of making such a disclosure can be avoided simply
by removing the capability for making subsequent modifications.
Prohibiting issuers from changing terms unless they notify
consumers of the changes leads to a sensible allocation of cost
between the issuer and the consumer."4 The issuer saves paper-
work costs by not having to keep records of purchasers, and the
consumer shares in those savings by the assurance that, once
purchased, the terms under which the card is used cannot be made
more onerous. A rule that permits issuers to change terms without
notice, by contrast, would confer all of the benefits of the reduced
record-keeping on the issuer, while imposing all of the costs of the
issuer's decision not to keep such records on the consumer.
c. Receipts and periodic statements
Regulation E requires financial institutions to make written receipts
available at electronic terminals."4  The receipts must contain
information that includes the amount of transfer and the date and
type of transfer.147 In addition, the institution must mall the
consumer a periodic statement on at least a monthly basis.
1 48
Congress apparently believed that consumers needed written
documents reflecting transfers in order to keep accurate records and
to have some evidence of activity affecting their accounts. This is
because the transfers contemplated by the EPTA may remove money
from the consumer's account at a financial institution. Such a written
accounting "allow[s] consumers to verify account activity and to detect
145. The author is indebted to James Brown, Center for Consumer Affairs, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, for this insight.
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unauthorized transactions and error, so that they can be reported and
resolved." 49
As the Board notes in its request for comment, it would be difficult
and costly to require receipts and periodic statements in off-line
systems. 5 ' In addition, to the extent consumers use the cards for
routine transactions and inexpensive purchases, they likely do not
need or want receipts or periodic statements. For example, it
probably is not necessary to require receipts for consumers buying
fare cards from vending machines. The Board, therefore, exempts all
off-line systems from this Regulation E requirement. 51  On-line
cards also are exempt if the cards carry $100 or less.
52
Although the FRB's general approach is reasonable, its proposal
should be modified to require issuers to provide written documenta-
tion in limited circumstances. In on-line and off-line accountable
systems, consumers should be able to request account balances and
histories for a limited period of time prior to each transaction. These
balances and histories should be available on at least a monthly basis
without charge."' 3 The request for comment proposes this ap-
proach as an alternative, but only for on-line systems." Further, it
offers cost as the sole reason not to apply this option to off-line
accountable systems.' The request acknowledges, however, that
most consumers never will request balances or histories because they
promptly will exhaust the value of the card.' This reasoning does
not justify the failure of the FRB to require issuers to supply this
information on request; rather, it provides the rationale for requiring
it. For instance, the information will not be costly because consumers
seldom would ask for it. In the rare case in Which a consumer makes
a request, presumably, he or she truly needs this information and
should be able to obtain it.'
5 7
149. 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,700.
150. See id. at 19,700-01.
151. See iH. at 19,701.
152. See id.
153. If the Board, nevertheless, permits a fee to be imposed for this information, the laiw
should require disclosure of the amount of the fee and provide that any such fee be reasonable.
154. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,702.
155. See id. at 19,700.
156. See id. at 19,702.
157. At the very least, if the Board decides not to require account balances and histories on
request and the issuer chooses not to provide consumers the right to receive such statements,
the initial disclosure should so inform the consumer.
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d. Limitations on consumer liability for unauthorized transfers
Regulation E establishes maximum limits on a consumer's liability
for unauthorized transfers.15 Liability is limited to $50 if the
consumer reports a loss or theft within two days of learning about
it.159 The consumer's liability is limited to $500 if he or she reports
the loss after two days and if the financial institution establishes that
the unauthorized transfer would not have occurred had the consumer
reported in a timely manner."6 If the consumer fails to report theft
or loss within sixty days of transmittal of a periodic statement that
includes the unauthorized transfer, the consumer is liable for up to
the full amount of that transfer."' This three-tiered scheme is less
protective of consumers than the $50 limit of liability that currently
exists for credit cards.162 For both electronic fund transfers and
credit cards, the limits apply regardless of whether the consumer was
careless and whether that negligence contributed to the unauthorized
transfer.1
6
Congress' limitation of consumer liability reflects its acknowledge-
ment that credit and debit cards are inherently risky payment devices.
Indeed, criminals have proven marvelously inventive in devising
innovative ways to steal using the account numbers and PINs from the
cards without actually stealing the cards. 1" Limiting liability en-
hances consumer trust in the integrity of these payment systems
despite their risks. Yet, exposing consumers to some liability provides
an incentive for them to take precautions to prevent unauthorized use
and to report it promptly to issuers when it does occur."
The proposed SVC rule would apply the Regulation E limits only to
on-line cards worth more than $100.166 The Board noted that
because other systems are off-line, the issuers and merchants could




162. SeeTruth in Lending (Regulation Z), id. § 226.12 (settingforth conditions of credit card
holder liability for unauthorized use).
163. See FRB Commentary to Regulation E, id. pt. 205, Supp. II, Question 6-6.5.
164. See DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS 6-14 to 6-16 (rev. ed. 1996) (observing that through process known as skimming, experts
can decipher and transfer PIN recorded on original card to counterfeit card and then access
funds using counterfeit card); see also Oguibene v. Citibank, NA., 446 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Small
Cl. Ct. 1981) (explaining scam in which PINs were stolen and used to withdraw money from
ATMs).
165. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 164, at 12-40 (observing that "some incentive had to
be produced to induce the cardholder to assume responsibility for safeguarding his or her card
and providing notice if the card was stolen").
166. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,703 (1996).
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neither easily and inexpensively block unauthorized transfers 67 nor
identify the consumer who paid for the card because such cards do
not include a PIN."6
In addition, the Board justified removing Regulation E's protection
from off-line and $100-and-under on-line cards by assuming that
consumers will carry less value on SVCs than is at risk on a debit card
that accesses a bank account-1 69
The proposed rule goes too far. Because all types of SVCs contain
features resembling debit cards, consumers reasonably may expect the
Regulation E liability limits to apply. If these limits do not apply,
consumers must be informed of that important fact. Yet, under the
proposed rule, only users of off-line accountable cards would be
informed of their full liability.7 ' Issuers of $100-and-under cards
and off-line unaccountable cards would not be required to inform
consumers of their full liability.' As discussed above, the differenc-
es between off-line unaccountable cards and other SVCs are invisible
to consumers. Consumers today already may be confused about the
differences between the liability limits for credit cards and debit
cards. 172 The proposed rule exacerbates the confusion by applying
the debit card limits to some types of SVCs, but not to others, and to
some on-line SVCs, but not to others. A better rule would require
informing all consumers of SVCs of the extent of their liability.
In addition, consumers using on-line cards that carry $100 or less
should have the same protection as others using on-line cards. As
discussed above, $100 is not de minimis to many consumers. 7
Further, the $100 exemption as applied to SVCs is not consistent with
any of the dollar amounts applied to any other payment device. The
$100 exemption results in a needlessly confusing liability scheme that
only the boldest of consumers would dare try to figure out. To wit:
167. See iL at 19,701 ("[T] here is an almost certain likelihood that lost or stolen cards could




171. Users of on-line SVCs, in contrast, would have the protection of the EFTA limits on
liability. See i. at 19,699.
172. Even more confusing are the liability limits for cards that may be used as both a credit
card and a debit card. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1996)
(demonstrating complexity of regulation governing consumer liability for transfers not
authorized properly); see also BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DErOsrrs,
COLLECTONS AND CREDIT CARDS 15-25 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing confusion regarding debit and
credit cards).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18 (explaining flaws in assumption that $100
constitutes de minimis amount).
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the liability maximum for credit cards is $50;"74 for debit cards, it is
$50, $500, or unlimited;75 for on-line SVCs worth more than $100,
it is the same as for debit cards. 76 For on-line SVCs worth $100 or
less, there is no limit and no right to be informed of this fact.
177
For users of off-line accountable SVCs, there is no limit, but there is
the right to be informed of that fact.178 Users of off-line unaccount-
able cards, however, not only have unlimited liability, but they also
lack the right to be informed that they have no liability limit'
79
e. Error resolution procedures
Regulation E outlines detailed procedures that financial institutions
must use for error resolution, including informing consumers of the
availability of error resolution services," procedures, and timetables
for investigating errors, the extent of the required investigation, and
procedures that must be followed after the investigation is complet-
ed.' For example, if the institution has not completed its investi-
gation within ten days, it must provisionally recredit the consumer's
account in the amount of the error and complete the investigation
within forty-five days."82
The proposed SVC rule would require procedures only for on-line
cards worth more than $100.'" For the reasons discussed previous-
ly, the $100 exemption is notjustified. Furthermore, at least a limited
procedure should be required for off-line accountable and off-line
unaccountable cards if the error is within the control of one of the
non-consumer parties to the transaction. For example, the card may
have a defective chip or the machine into which the card was inserted
may have damaged the card. The consumer is entitled at least to
know the name, address, and telephone number of a responsible
party to whom the consumer can complain if something goes wrong.
Especially in the case of multi-purpose cards, consumers will have no
idea to whom they can go for assistance. Without minimum error
174. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.12.
175. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), id. § 205.6.
176. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 19,699 (noting lack of right to be informed).
180. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.R § 205.7(a) (10) (providing for
notice to consumers of error resolution service).
181. See id. § 205.11(d) (describing procedures financial institutions must undertake after
completing investigation, including providing written explanation to consumers).
182. See id. § 205.11(c) (2) (i) (providing for provisional crediting).
183. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,701. But see supra text accompanying notes 171-79 (maintaining
that $100 exemption is not justified and detailing problems in setting $100 threshold for
protection).
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resolution procedures and corresponding accountability, the integrity
of SVCs as a payment mechanism will be compromised severely.
B. FDIC Insurance Coverage and other FDIC Concerns
1. The opinion of the general counsel
The General Counsel of the FDIC has issued an opinion on the
question of "whether the funds underlying stored value cards
constitute deposits under the FDIA [Federal Deposit Insurance
Act]."" The opinion concluded that FDIC deposit insurance
extends only to SVC systems in which the funds underlying the value
reflected in the card remain in the account until the value is
transferred to a third party, such as a merchant, who then collects the
funds from the consumer's bank." The General Counsel acknowl-
edged that its staff did not know of any current system meeting that
description, but understood it was possible to develop such a
system. 8' The General Counsel reached this conclusion through a
detailed analysis of the section of the FDIA that defines the term
"deposit.""87 It is notable that, in order to apply the FDIA to SVCs,
the General Counsel characterized SVC systems in a manner entirely
different than the FRB's approach."s This reflects the difficulty of
conceptualizing SVC systems and of constructing a regulatory
framework suitable to SVCs.
Of perhaps greater significance than the opinion itself are the
similarities the General Counsel found between SVCs and other
payment devices, the General Counsel's listing of other issues about
which the FDIC is concerned, and the agency's expectations regarding
the disclosures that SVCs should contain. In the course of determin-
ing whether SVC funds come within the FDIA's definition of
"deposit," the General Counsel noted the similarity of SVCs to other
payment devices, including certain travelers' checks, 8 9 money
orders, and cashier's checks."9  This demonstrates the legitimate
confusion consumers may harbor regarding their rights and obliga-
184. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,40,491
n.6 (1996).
185. See id. at 40,494.
186. See id. at 40,490 n.4.
187. See id. at 40,491-93 (analyzing term "deposit" as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (1994)).
188. The FDIC General Counsel categorized SVC systems as "Bank Primary-Reserve Systems,"
"Bank Secondary-Advance Systems," and "Bank Secondary-Pre-Acquisition Systems." Id. at
40,490.
189. See Ud. at 40,491.
190. See id. at 40,493.
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tions when using SVCs. Moreover, the General Counsel stated that
although SVCs have been "touted as substitutes for cash," that is one
type of payment device to which SVCs are not similar."' Presum-
ably, the General Counsel's reference was to the advertisements and
other promotional materials the SVC industry has distributed. 192 As
the General Counsel's statement implies, touting SVCs as a cash
substitute is misleading and further increases consumer confu-
sion.193
In addition to addressing the issue of FDIC deposit insurance
coverage, the General Counsel noted that there were several other
questions "which are of great importance to the FDIC and which the
FDIC will continue to monitor as appropriate. Such issues include,
but are not limited to, consumer disclosure matters, systemic risk,
security, electronic funds transfer matters, reserve requirements,
counterfeiting, monetary policy, and money laundering."194 Several
of these matters, which the FDIC has indicated it considers to be of
great importance, already are within the purview of other agencies.
For example, the FRB regulates electronic fund transfers and
consumer disclosure through Regulation E and is involved directly in
setting monetary policy and reserve requirements. The Treasury
Department handles matters relating to counterfeiting and money
laundering. 95 SVC technology thus raises issues in which major
federal agencies are involved, demonstrating its potential significance
to the payment system as a whole.
Ultimately, the General Counsel's opinion was confined to the sole
question of whether FDIC deposit insurance covered SVCs, and the
General Counsel construed the FDIA extremely narrowly. Neverthe-
less, the General Counsel included a strong suggestion that financial
institutions voluntarily inform consumers when FDIC deposit
insurance does not protect their use of SVCs.19'
191. See id. at 40,490. The FDIC General Counsel noted that SVCs "do not have the finality
of cash," id., and are not "legal tender," id. at 40,490 n.2.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70 (discussing certain misleading marketing
strategies used to promote SVCs).
193. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,490 (noting that actual process by which SVCs function "may not
be apparent to the consumer"); supra text accompanying notes 43-70 (noting potential for
consumer confusion).
194. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,491 n.6.
195. SeeMatt Schulz, Treasury: Include Smart Cards in Laundering Rules, AM. BANKERJune 27,
1996, at 13 (noting that Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers argues that "the
United States and other countries must adapt their anti-laundering rules to account for these
new products").
196. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494 ("[T]he FDIC would expect that institutions clearly and
conspicuously disclose to their customers the insured or non-insured status of their stored value
products, as appropriate.").
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2. The request for comment
On the same day the General Counsel's Opinion was published in
the Federal Register, the FDIC also published a Request for Comment
on deposit insurance coverage for SVCs. 97 The FDIC explained
that in addition to the statutory authority on which the General
Counsel relied in its opinion, the FDIC could require deposit
insurance on SVC systems under a provision that authorizes such
action if the FDIC finds "that some or all stored value card obligations
of a depository institution are deposit liabilities by general usage."'
198
The FDIC explained that although it had no present intention to
issue regulations on this matter, it desired comment from the public
because it may consider regulating on the basis of "general usage" in
the future." The FDIC indicated that its concerns stretch well
beyond stored value cards, stating that the SVC policy analysis "would
in general apply to a variety of electronic payment system issues,
including concerns raised by Internet banking and the use of
electronic cash."' "
Although the FRB's discussion of its proposed SVC regulations
focused on whether the possible benefits of regulating SVCs outweigh
the cost of regulation to industry,"' the FDIC request points to the
potential that "a significant portion of the payment system could be
represented by stored value systems."202  It therefore is incumbent
on the FDIC to determine whether deposit insurance coverage is
necessary to ensure public confidence in SVCs. This is a decisive
assessment because "public confidence in these payment systems is
critical to the safety and soundness of the banking system. "203 The
FDIC believes that ascertaining consumer expectations is highly
relevant to examining public confidence in SVCs. 214 Such expecta-
tions are of particular importance in considering the features of
various SVC systems. For example, although the FDIC staff believes
197. See Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494
(1996).
198. Id. at 40,495. The FDIC based its authority for such action on 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (5)
(1994).
199. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494.
200. Id.
201. SeeElectronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,699 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 6, 1996) (discussing "the compliance burdens to financial
institutions and the benefits to consumers").
202. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496.
203. Id.
204. See U (discussing interrelationship between "public confidence" and "the expectations
of depository institution customers").
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that whether a card is disposable or reloadable is not relevant to
whether an SVC is a deposit within the definition of the FDIA, it may
well be relevant to consumer expectations.
20 5
One of the difficulties in regulating SVCs arises from the fact that
unregulated non-financial institutions, as well as financial institutions,
offer SVCs. Although the FRB has the power to regulate institutions
not generally under its authority,26 the FDIC does not. Therefore,
the FDIC is concerned that if it requires broad coverage of deposit
insurance, depository institution issuers may be at a competitive
disadvantage because other businesses will not have the added
disadvantage of insuring the funds in SVCs. 207 Conversely, the FDIC
also believes that consumers may prefer to purchase SVCs from firms
that offer the protection of insurance.
Presumably, consumers who purchase SVCs in large denominations
would be the ones most attracted to insurance. If, however, the
public learns that issuers of uninsured SVCs are going out of business
and failing to honor their SVCs consumers of even small denomina-
tion cards may decide to purchase SVCs from depository institutions.
Consumers also may prefer to buy SVCs from depository institutions
because they believe the cards are insured, even if the FDIC decides
not to require banks to insure most types of cards.
The FRB's proposed amendment to Regulation E exempts SVCs in
denominations of $100 and less. 28 The FDIC's Request for Com-
ment, however, contains a statement questioning that decision. The
FDIC points out that although SVCs currently are being issued in
amounts totaling no more than $100 or $200, "nothing prevent[s]
consumers from obtaining many stored value cards. Moreover, issuers
may soon allow cards to be loaded ... in larger denominations."
209
The FDIC believes this factor may justify requiring insurance
coverage.
210
Finally, the FDIC's Request for Comment repeats the expectation
of the FDIC's General Counsel that depository institutions will make
disclosures to consumers.1 The documents, however, require two
205. See id.
206. Seesupra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that EFTA gives FRB power to regulate
nonbank institutions that provide electronic fund accounts).
207. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12 (noting that Federal Reserve Board chose to
exempt stored value cards with values less than $100).
209. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496-97.
210. See id. at 40,497.
211. See id. at 40,496 ("[T]he [FDIC] would expect that the relationship between a stored
value card customer and the institution to be dearly and conspicuously stated on the disclosures
and agreements accompanying the card.").
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different types of disclosure. The General Counsel expects institu-
dons to "clearly and conspicuously disclose ... the insured or non-
insured status of their stored value products, as appropriate." 21 2 In
contrast, the FDIC Request for Comment states that "the staff would
expect the relationship between a stored value card customer and the
institution to be clearly and conspicuously stated on the disclosures
and agreements accompanying the card."213 Presumably, the FDIC
is referring to the legal relationship between the consumer and the
issuer. This relationship, however, is complex and depends on
whether the stored value customer has a deposit account with the
institution selling the card. The agreement between the parties,
which probably is contained in a bank's brochure, governs the
relationship under this language. In addition, depending upon the
type of account the customer has, if any,214 the legal relationship
may be governed, among other things, by the U.C.C., Regulation E,
and the regulations of federal and state regulatory agencies.
The FDIC, however, may have a far more restrictive view of the type
of disclosure required. The Request for Comment states that the staff
understands that issuers intend to "inform customers that the card is
to be treated like cash, and that if lost or stolen, it will not be
replaced."21 Given the vagueness of this statement, the FDIC
should explain what it intends with regard to its expectation that
issuers will disclose the relationship between the issuer and the
consumer.
The FDIC staff states that if an institution's SVCs are not covered
by insurance, "such disclosures and agreements should provide that
the card does not constitute an account or deposit with the institution
and that the funds underlying the card are not insured by the
FDIC."216 If read literally, this language would require disclosure
only if the cards are not insured. The FDIC General Counsel agrees
that institutions that sell uninsured cards should make this disclosure,
but also expects institutions that do provide insurance to inform
consumers of their insurance coverage.1 The General Counsel's
formulation would better serve to inform consumers and should be
adopted by the FDIC.
212. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; StoredValue Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,40,494
(1996).
213. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496.
214. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
215. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,496.
216. Id.
217. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494.
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Although the General Counsel expects clear and conspicuous.
disclosure, it does not indicate where the disclosure should be made.
The staff expects information to be placed both in disclosure
statements and agreements. The FDIC's Request for Comment
suggests disclosures could be included in material provided to
consumers when they open their accounts or "along with the
card." ' The FRB does not require its disclosures to be "clear and
conspicuous." Issuers need clear and consistent guidance in order to
reduce the burden of regulation. Consumers need uniform and
consistent disclosures so they can have essential information and
compare features of various SVCs.
C. The OCC Bulletin
The Comptroller of the Currency has issued an "OCC Bulletin" to
the national banks it regulates to provide them with information that
will assist them "in fulfilling their responsibility to identify and
manage risks as they become involved in stored value systems." 9
In addition, the Bulletin "raises basic consumer awareness issues."220
The OCC's description of SVCs, like those of the FRB and FDIC,
notes the similarity between some SVC systems and debit cards. The
OCC acknowledges that "[t]he distinction between debit and stored
value cards ... can be fuzzy."22 1 In contrast to the other agencies,
however, the OCC compares other systems to "electronic cash," a term
other agencies do not use.222 The OCC defines electronic cash as
the transfer of value from SVCs using an ATM, personal computer,
telephone, television cable connection, or POS terminal.223
The OCC's description of the various roles banks can play in SVC
systems illustrates why consumers will be confused about their legal
relationship with banks involved in SVC commerce. A bank may be
an investor in SVC systems, an issuer of SVCs 22 4 a distributing
bank,2I a transaction authorizing bank,226 a redeeming bank,227
218. Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,700 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt.205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
219. OCC Bulletin 96-48, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, ALLOC File, (Sept. 10,
1996) [hereinafter OCC Bulletin].
220. Id,
221. 1& at 2.
222. See id. at 1. To compare the terms used by the FRB and the FDIC, see supra notes 85-
95, 188 and accompanying text.
223. See id. at 2.
224. See id. at 4.
225. See id. at 5.
226. See id. at 6. A transaction authorizing bank is needed in those SVC systems in which
merchants must obtain authorization before accepting SVCs.
227. See id. at 7.
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a clearing and settling bank, or a transaction archiving bank.22 The
OCC Bulletin outlines the risks to banks when they assume these
various roles.
Because SVCs resemble credit and debit cards but function
differently and expose consumers to different risks, the OCC has
instructed banks "to take appropriate steps to adequately inform
consumers of their rights and responsibilities when using stored value
cards."229  Banks are "encourage[d] to consider basic disclosures
needed" for SVCs.2 °  The Bulletin then provides a list of factors
contributing to the need for disclosure, which it purports is not
exhaustive. The list contains numerous items, including: (1) how the
card is used; (2) where and how consumers can increase the card's
value; (3) whether the value on the card earns any type of return; (4)
facts related to redemption; (5) disclosure of fees; (6) the name of
the issuer and whether the issuer is obligated to redeem value; (7)
whether there is protection if the card is lost or stolen; (8) whether
value on the card is insured; (9) where liability lies if the transaction
is not "properly consummated"; (10) what happens if the card is
abandoned or expires; (11) how disputes can be resolved; (12) and
how information may be disclosed to third parties.28 '
Unlike the proposed FRB amendment to Regulation E,232 the
OCC Bulletin list applies to all types of stored value cards.283 It also
differs from the proposed Regulation E amendment in that it does
not suggest when, where, or how the disclosures should be made. In
contrast to the FDIC Request for Comment,2 4 the OCC Bulletin
does not require any disclosures to be "clear and conspicuous," but
indicates that banks should inform consumers of whether value is
insured. 25 Contrary to the proposed FRB amendment, it encourag-
es banks to follow the EFTA's requirements regarding disclosure of
information to third parties regardless of the type of SVC the bank
sells. The list also makes an important contribution to the discussion
228. See id. at 8. A transaction archiving bank keeps records of transactions using SVCs.
229. Id at 9.
230. Id. at 10.
231. See id.
232. Seesupratext accompanying notes 109-12 (noting that FRB chose to regulate onlystored
value cards that cannot carry more than $100 at one time).
233. See OCC Bulletin, supra note 219, at 10.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13 (noting that FDIC Request for Comment in
part agrees with opinion of General Counsel that whether stored value card is insured should
be disclosed).
235. SeeOCC Bulletin, supra note 219, at 10. The FDIC Request for Commentwould require
disclosure only if the value is not insured. See supra text accompanying note 216 (noting that
FDIC Request for Comment is less stringent regarding insurance disclosure but still does not
require disclosure if no insurance is provided).
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of consumer interests that may need protection by including items
not mentioned in the FDIC and FRB statements, such as abandoned
and expired cards. Despite its greater comprehensiveness, the OCC
Bulletin's list is less protective of consumers than the proposed FRB
amendments because it does not require banks to do anything; it
merely encourages them to provide consumers with basic information.
According to the Bulletin, banks are required only to "take appropri-
ate steps to adequately inform consumers."2 6
D. The Legal Vacuum
Several crucial issues confronting consumers using SVCs are not
governed by any law.217 It is important that the government enact
laws to fill this vacuum to ensure the integrity of the SVC payment
system and public confidence in SVCs. The Business Law Section of
the American Bar Association established a task force "to consider the
commercial law that may govern these new electronic retail payments
media, and to see whether some tried and true principles of our
commercial law may provide useful building blocks that will facilitate
development."2" Although the Task Force had not approved the
Discussion Draft at the time of this writing, the Draft provides
valuable insights into those issues that are not addressed in the
federal regulatory law discussed thus far.
The potentially misleading nature of advertisements heralding SVCs
as a cash substitute239 is suggested by the opinion of the FDIC
General Counsel who noted that the value on the SVC is not legal
tender.2' 4  The Discussion Draft agrees, describes the difference
between "money" and legal tender, and concludes that SVCs are
neither. Rather, SVCs merely represent evidence of a claim.24' The
value in the card is "no more than a representation of someone's
236. OCC Bulletin, supra note 219, at 9.
237. See The Future of Money: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l Monetary Policy
oftheHouse Comm. on Banking &Fin. Sews., 104th Cong. 6 (1995) (statement of Alan S. Blinder,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Hearings on the
Future of Money] (discussing lack of legal protections and regulations for consumers in stored
value card market).
238. A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Commercial Law
Issues Associated With Stored Value Cards and Electronic Money (Third Discussion Draft July
31, 1996), at 2-3 [hereinafter Task Force].
239. See supra text accompanying note 43 (discussing one marketing strategy utilized in
Atlanta).
240. See FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,
40,490 n.2 (1996).
241. See Task Force, supra note 238, at 30-31. The FDIC General Counsel concurs,
characterizing the information in SVCs as "more in the nature of a right to be paid a sum of
money." 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,490 n.2.
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promise to pay. "242 It is an "intangible claim."243  Consequently,
"[firom a legal perspective, it is not useful and perhaps misleading to
characterize this as a transfer of money."
244
The Discussion Draft describes various ways in which consumers will
be confused or ignorant of basic information about the parties to the
SVC transaction, the role each party plays, and the rights and
obligations that attach to SVC transactions. 24  For example, con-
sumers may believe the advertising that gives the mistaken impression
that SVCs are a cash substitute and therefore operate like money or
even like legal tender, when in actuality they are nothing more than
an "IOU."246 Consumers therefore may not realize how crucial it is
to know the creditworthiness of the issuer, the person responsible for
paying the obligation represented by the value on the card.247  If
the entity obligated to pay refuses to do so, or is unable to do so
because of insolvency, merchants will refuse to honor SVCs, and
consumers will be left holding worthless cards.
Even if the consumer understands that it is important to buy cards
from a reputable and financially strong obligor" the consumer
may have a difficult time ascertaining the identity of the obligor. The
company selling the card to the consumer may not be the same entity
as the issuer.2 49 The names of several companies may be on the
card with no one company identified as the issuer or obligor.250  It
therefore is important for each card to contain the name of the entity
responsible for paying the claim represented by the value in the card.
Laws also are needed to ensure the financial soundness of issuers.251
242. Task Force, supra note 238, at 38.
243. Id. at 41.
244. Id.
245. See generally Task Force, supra note 238. For example, the Discussion Draft points out
the problems consumers might have in determining the obligor of the SVC. See id. at 46-48.
246. See id. at 38 (finding that value in SVCs is nothing more than promise to pay).
247. See id. at 46-48 (discussing difficulty and importance in determining who is obligor of
SVC). "In the commercial world, a party that extends credit is usually willing to do so only
because that party has sufficiently detailed knowledge about the debtor to conclude that when
the debt is due it will be paid." Id. at 19. Several prepaid phone card companies have gone out
of business after selling tens of thousands of worthless SVCs. See supra note 54.
248. See Task Force, supra note 238, at 46-48 (discussing importance of determining who is
obligor of SVC). "The identification of the issuer is critical because it is the only way for
potential users of the products to measure the credit risk associated with the new payment
products; as stated earlier, the obligation is only as valuable as the issuer is credit worthy." Id.
at 46.
249. See id. at 47 (Finding that issuer of SVC may not be same entity as provider of stored
obligation or reader making SVC transferrable).
250. See id. (finding that issuer's name may be one of many names on SVC).
251. See supra text accompanying note 237 (discussing legal vacuum confronting consumers
on several crucial issues).
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The FRB's proposed amendment to Regulation E would require
companies that issue certain types of SVCs to make some of the
disclosures Regulation E mandates. 2 The regulation specifies how
and when these disclosures can be made.253 Many SVCs, however,
are not subject to any disclosure requirements under this propos-
al.254  Furthermore, the agreement between the issuer and the
consumer likely will contain many items that are not subject to
Regulation E disclosure requirements.15 Except for general stan-
dards of good faith and unconscionability and unfair and deceptive
practices, statutes, an issuer is free to contract with the consumer in
any manner it wishes. As a result, the issuer may disclose only those
matters specifically required by law and add the following statement:
Use of this stored value card is "governed by the terms and conditions
of Issuer/Customer Agreement, a written copy of which is available by
contacting Issuer."2 56  The SVC that First Union issues has the
following printed on the card: "Use and acceptance of this Card will
indicate your agreement to the First Union VISA Cash Card terms &
conditions that govern its use."257 The NationsBank SVC contains
the following written statement: "This card is subject to the terms of
the applicable Cash Card agreement."5 NationsBank also provides
purchasers with a brochure that contains, inter alia, an agree-
ment.259 Lack of a uniform statute governing the manner of
making the agreement available to the consumer fosters disparate
methods of application and can foster consumer ignorance. Impor-
tant terms, such as whether the consumer has a right to redeem
unused value, and if so, how to redeem that value may be buried in
an agreement in the possession of the issuer. It may not be clear to
the consumer who the issuer is, much less how to obtain the
agreement from the issuer.
The disclosures discussed above are those made to the consumer
initially, prior to or at the point of sale. Regulation E also requires
written notice of a change in terms and requires that the notice be
mailed or delivered at least twenty-one days before it becomes
252. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37 (explaining structural flaws in proposed
amendment to Regulation E by FRB).
253. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 G.F.R.§ 205.7 (1996).
254. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining Regulation E and its provisions applicable to SVCs).
255. For example, matters such as redeemability and expiration of the cards may be included
in the agreement.
256. Task Force, supra note 238, at 57.
257. A copy of the First Union SVC is on file with The American University Law Review.
258. A copy of the NationsBank SVG is on file with The American University Law Review.
259. A copy of the agreement is on file with The American University Law Review.
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effective.2' Failure to require that all types of SVCs comply with
Regulation E could allow issuers to change important terms, such as
the expiration date, without notice to consumers.2 61  The
NationsBank SVC agreement provides: "This agreement is subject to
amendment by NationsBank at any time without prior no-
tice ... 262
While the FRB's proposed amendment to Regulation E, the FDIC's
Request for Comment, and the OCC Bulletin would require or
encourage certain disclosures, these agencies refrain from mandating
minimum standards for the agreements between the parties except in
very limited situations. An example of those limited situations are the
narrowly defined SVC transactions to which the FRB proposes to apply
Regulation E in full. As to those transactions, issuers would be
required to impose limits on the consumer's liability for unauthorized
transfers.2 In the vast majority of SVC transactions, except for
whatever protection issuers may have to provide in order to market
a competitive product and subject to general legal standards such as
good faith and unconscionability, issuers are free to impose restric-
tions and obligations on consumers, and to grant themselves
protection from obligation and responsibility. For example, the
NationsBank agreement provides: "We may assess fees for certain
services in connection with the Card."2" The nature of those
services is not described, nor is the amount of the fees. The
consumer may not redeem unused value remaining after the
expiration date. Instead, the unused balances will be donated to a
charity chosen by NationsBank.
Clear legal rules are necessary to establish the contours of finality
and discharge.2" The issue is whether the transfer of value from
the consumer's card to the seller is regarded as final, thus discharging
260. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 G.F.R.§ 205.8(a) (1) (1996).
261. In some types of SVCs, the issuer has no information about the identity of the consumer
purchasing the card. One regulatory response is to exempt those types of cards from Regulation
E; another response is to prohibit post-contract changes in terms unless the issuer notifies the
initial purchaser. If an issuer chooses to sell cards to persons whose identities and addresses it
does not obtain, that issuer forgoes the ability to change the terms of use of the card. This
response should not pose a significant burden on issuers of disposable cards, as these cards
generally are issued in small denominations and the value can be expected to be exhausted
within a short period of time. It is unlikely, therefore, that a reputable issuer would need to
change the terms within the period of use.
262. A copy of the agreement is on file with The American University Law Review.
263. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6.
264. A copy of the agreement is on file with The American University Law Review.
265. See generally Hearings on the Future of Money, supra note 237, at 4-8 (statement of Alan S.
Blinder, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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any obligation that the consumer had."6 If there is no finality at
that point, problems may arise if the issuer becomes insolvent and
cannot honor its obligation to the seller.267 For example, the seller
may approach the consumer, demanding that the consumer pay
again, forcing the consumer to seek payment from the insolvent issuer
for having to pay the seller twice.
It is unreasonable to assume that consumers using SVCs will assess
the risk that the issuer might not pay the seller. Consumers likely
have no idea how sellers receive value when payment is made with an
SVC. Even if the consumer is aware that the issuer pays the seller, the
consumer often will not be able to determine who the issuer is.2"
Even if the consumer is able to determine the identity of the issuer,
the transaction costs of ascertaining whether the issuer was in danger
of insolvency or for some other reason might not honor its obligation
to the seller would be too great to justify making such an inquiry.
Likely, most consumers reasonably expect that payment using an SVC
is final at the point of sale and discharges their obligation to the
seller. In order to ensure public trust and confidence in the payment
system, consumers need legal rules which provide that SVC payment
is regarded as final. If payment at the point of sale is not final and
does not result in discharge, the law should require issuers to notify
consumers of that fact.
Rules also are needed to provide consumers with an error resolu-
tion procedure and with legal remedies when there is technological
or equipment failure. Examples of such failure include defective
SVCs and defective card readers.269 Defects in these could result in
erroneously erasing the entire value from the chip in the card. The
law should require issuers to inform consumers of the identity of the
party to whom they can report this problem, and deadlines should be
set to ensure that consumers are not deprived of value for unduly
long periods of time when there is no dispute over the legitimacy of
their claim.27 The law also should specify the type of relief to
which consumers are entitled when they suffer loss due to technologi-
cal or equipment failure.
266. See Task Force, supra note 238, at 75-76 (discussing hypothetical regarding discharging
of obligations pursuant to transfer of value from consumer to seller).
267. See id- at 75 (stating importance of addressing problems faced when insolvent issuer
cannot honor its obligation to consumer).
268. See supra text accompanying note 16 (explaining how names of both bank and company
associated with credit card may be found on SVC).
269. See Task Force, supra note 238, at 91.
270. Regulation E establishes a detailed error resolution procedure, see 12 G.F.R. § 205.11
(1996), but the FRB's proposed amendment to Regulation E would exempt most SVCs from this
procedure. See supra text accompanying note 91 (discussing "off-line accountable" SVG).
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IV. A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STORED VALUE CARDS
The federal government should enact laws to provide a legal
framework for SVC transactions that guarantees consumers a
minimum standard of protection. Because of the complexity and
variety of SVC systems, laws governing basic issues are necessary in
order for consumers to have crucial information and to safeguard the
money they pay for SVCs. Without information, consumers cannot
assess accurately the benefits and disadvantages of using SVCs rather
than other systems. Furthermore, because of the similarity of SVCs
to other payment systems, consumers may have reasonable but
erroneous expectations with regard to their rights and obligations if
they do not receive adequate disclosures. Without a legal safety net,
whatever trust and confidence consumers may have in SVCs initially
may evaporate quickly when a major problem occurs and is widely
publicized. For example, if a major issuer becomes insolvent,
consumers may stop using SVCs and find themselves holding
worthless cards. Consequently, regulation is not merely a way to
ensure consumer education and protection, it also is a way to
promote consumer acceptance of SVCs. At the same time, it is
important not to over-regulate SVCs. The device still is in its early
stages of development, and regulation should not stifle or unduly
influence the direction of further development of this product.
Moreover, the complexity and diversity of SVC systems make detailed
regulation problematic.
Federal agencies should regulate SVCs pursuant to congressional
legislation. Uniformity is vital; otherwise, consumer rights and
disclosure may vary from state to state. Such variation would result in
consumer confusion and would impose a tremendous burden on
issuers. Drafting a uniform state law such as the U.C.C. likely would
take many years,271 and individual states could adopt nonuniform
amendments. Nonuniform state law also presents choice of law issues;
the parties involved in the SVC transaction often will be in different
states. 272 Thus, even if consumers educate themselves about their
rights and obligations under their state's laws, when a dispute arises,
271. The process that culminated in the revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C., the
portions of the U.C.C. that govern payment systems, began in 1974 and was not completed until
1990. See Fred H. Miller, UC.C. Articles3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV.
405, 407 (1991).
272. Cf Task Force, supra note 238, at 121 (using hypothetical involving different states in
SVC transaction to underscore choice of law issues). See generally Peter Wallsten, PSC Calls Phone
Debit Cards into Question, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at 1B (reporting that Florida
Public Service Commission proposes regulating phone SVCs).
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they could find themselves subject to the law of a jurisdiction with
which they are not familiar.
The nation already has federal statutes governing comparable
payment systems such as electronic fund transfers and agencies
experienced in drafting regulations pursuant to those laws. Federal
law has the advantage of uniformity. In addition, it is far easier to
change the law on the federal level rather than to seek changes in
every state. Therefore, if future technological developments or
unforeseen consumer or industry problems necessitate amendments
to the statute, these amendments can be made more quickly and in
a uniform manner. Often, changes can be effectuated through
amending regulations rather than through statutory change, a process
more expeditious than congressional action.
Federal SVC legislation should govern nonbanks as well as banks.
One could argue that it would promote consumer interests not to
impose regulation on nonbanks. Presumably, unregulated nonbanks
that do not agree voluntarily to protect consumers using their cards
would be able to pass on to consumers their lower costs by offering,
among other things, favorable terms such as low or no fees for
purchasing the cards, low cost methods for redeeming unused value,
and coupons each time value is reloaded onto the cards. Arguably,
consumers should be able to choose between those unregulated
nonbanks and regulated banks that may not be able to offer the same
low-cost terms as nonbanks, but that can promote their product by
emphasizing the consumer protection accompanying their cards.
73
Similar concerns have faced lawmakers with regard to every other
industry offering payment services. Overwhelmingly, the response has
been to provide a safety net by guaranteeing users of those services
basic protection. Examples include U.C.C. rules and standards for
checks, 4 the Expedited Funds Availability Act ensuring customers
prompt access to their funds on depositY the Electronic Fund
273. See Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,
40,496 (1996) (stating that consumers may be willing to pay higher price for FDIC insured cards;
thus, banks that must provide such insurance might not be at competitive disadvantage in vying
for customers against nonbanks). The American Bankers Association recommends that only
regulated depository institutions should be allowed to issue third-party SVCs. By limiting the
recommendation to third-party SVCs, they intend to exclude from this restriction two-party cards
such as many types of fare and phone cards. American Bankers Ass'n Payments System Task Force,
THE ROLE OF BANKS IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM OF THE FuTuRE 18 (1996). The Hong Kong
Monetary has established guidelines for non-bank SVC issuers. Guidelines Set for Stored Value
Cards, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 18. 1996, at 4.
274. SeeU.C.C. arts. 3 & 4 (1990).
275. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994).
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Transfers Act,276 and the credit card provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act.277  With regard to products that both banks and
nonbanks offer, the legislation governing credit cards and electronic
fund transfers applies to both types of institutions.7 In addition,
states have enacted statutes governing individuals in the business of
money transmission, requiring licensing,279 protecting customers in
the event the business fails,2' requiring disclosures, 281 and restrict-
ing investments.8 2 These statutes regulate nonbanks selling prod-
ucts such as money orders and travelers' checks.
Regulating nonbanks as well as banks ensures the integrity of the
total payment system. Without universal regulation, the danger is that
consumers will fall to distinguish between those institutions that are
regulated, and those that are not. Consequently, they may lose their
trust and confidence in all institutions providing payment transfer
services. Because of the similarity between SVG systems and other
types of payment devices, the public's loss of confidence may not be
confined to businesses that sell SVCs. Rather, the loss of confidence
may extend to all businesses that sell payment devices of any kind. In
addition to the loss of trust and confidence, failure to regulate
nonbanks poses the risk of major nonbank businesses becoming
insolvent or refusing to honor their obligations for other reasons,
resulting in serious monetary loss to consumers using and businesses
accepting SVCs. That loss might have consequential detrimental
effects that could reverberate throughout the economy.
The federal statute and regulations should use Regulation E as their
model, but should go further to fill in the fundamental gaps in the
law. To the extent the definition of "account" in the EFTA is too
narrow to extend to all SVC systems, it should be broadened. 2 3
The FRB's proposal to extend full Regulation E coverage to most "on-
line" SVC systems should be implemented. The proposal is misguid-
ed, however, in urging that cards capable of holding $100 or less
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-93 (1994).
277. I& §§ 1601-1920.
278. The Truth in Lending Act defines "card issuer" as "any person who issues a credit card."
Id § 1602(n). The Electronic Funds TransferAct defines "finandal institution" to include "any
other person who, directly or indirectly, holds an account belonging to a consumer." Id.
§ 1693(a) (8).
279. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW arts. XIII-B & XIII-C (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1996).
280. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-109(5) (1991).
281. See, e.g., CAL FIN. CODE § 33525 (West 1996) (requiring disclosure that travelers' checks
are not covered by government insurance).
282. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-55-109(5).
283. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,699 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996) (stating that FRB is not certain that definition of
.account" covers off-line unaccountable systems).
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value be completely exempt"= Issuers of those cards at least should
be subject to disclosure requirements.2" In addition, "off-line unac-
countable" cards should be subject at a minimum to disclosure
requirements. Consumers are ignorant of the fact that some systems
are "off-line unaccountable" and some are "off-line accountable."
From the perspective of reasonable consumer expectations, it makes
no sense to subject one system to disclosure requirements, as the
proposal recommends, but to deprive purchasers of those under the
other system of basic information.
The regulatory agencies that have issued statements concerning
SVCs suggest the contents of the disclosures. Under the FRB's
proposal, consumers would be entitled to disclosure of their liability
for unauthorized transactions, the types of transfers available,
transaction charges, and error resolution procedures available.28
The FDIC urges depository institutions to "clearly and conspicuously"
state "the relationship between the stored value card customer and
the institution," and to disclose, when applicable, that the funds
underlying the card are not considered a deposit and are not FDIC
insured.8 7 The OCC has a long list of topics banks should consider
disclosing, including: how to use the card; where and how to reload
the card; whether the funds in the card earn interest; where, how,
and when the card can be redeemed; fees charged; the name of the
issuer and its obligation to redeem; who has liability if a transaction
is not properly consummated; what happens if the card is abandoned
or expires; how disputes can be resolved; and whether information
about SVC transactions will be disclosed to others.288 Consumers
need all the information on the OCC list.
In addition, the consumer should receive the following information:
the name, address, and phone number of the party who assumes
responsibility for paying the claim represented by the value stored in
the card and for resolving whatever type of problem or complaint the
284. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18 (explaining flaws in $100 exemption).
285. See supra text and accompanying notes 171-79 (asserting that holders of SVCs worth
$100 or less should be informed of extent of their liability). If lawmakers insist on completely
exempting low-value cards, the exception should be limited to disposable cards, that is, cards
that cannot be reloaded. In addition, a $100 exemption does not relate to any amount with
which consumers are familiar. A $50 limit at least relates to the $50 maximum of a consumer's
liability when a credit card is lost or stolen and corresponds to the initial liability limit for lost
or stolen debit cards. Consequently, consumers may understand in a somewhat vague and
general way that there is a relationship between $50 and risk.
286. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,700.
287. Stored Value Cards and Other Electronic Payment Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,494,40,496
(1996).
288. See OCC Bulletin, supra note 219, at 10.
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consumer has;289 the presence or absence of insurance or some
other fund in case of insolvency; whether the issuer is a government
or a private entity; whether the issuer is a bank or a nonbank;
20
whether payment for goods and services discharges the consumer's
obligation or exposes the consumer to a claim by the seller if the
issuer fails to honor its obligation to the seller;29' whether the issuer
can change the terms and conditions of use of the card without
notice to the consumer; clear disclosure of the expiration date;
29 2
and whether the consumer is liable for a malfunctioning card.
Obviously, not all of these disclosures can be printed on the card.
Through regulation, issuers should be instructed as to which
disclosures must be printed on the card and which can be contained
in separate brochures or other documents. Certain disclosures are
vital and should be printed on the card. These include the name,
address, and telephone number of the party or parties who are
responsible for handling any consumer complaints or problems, and
the consumer's liability for lost, stolen, or malfunctioning cards. The
regulation also should specify when the disclosures must be made.
Disclosure at the time the consumer purchases the card would be
most meaningful. The SVC statute should require that if the issuer
does not provide a copy of the full agreement at the time of pur-
chase, the consumer must be provided with an address or phone
number through which the consumer can obtain a copy of the
agreement free of charge.
In drafting the Truth in Lending Act, Congress recognized that to
fulfill the statute's purpose of promoting the "informed use of
credit,"9 3 it was necessary to impose requirements on the advertis-
ing of credit terms.294 Congress should consider whether there is
a need for specific legislation to ensure that SVCs are not advertised
in a misleading manner. Although it is important for an SVC law not
to prohibit advertising claims that amount to no more than "puffing,"
it also is crucial that SVCs not be advertised in a manner that suggests
289. The OCC Bulletin merely suggests disclosing the name of the issuer. If different
companies are assuming responsibility for different types of problems, the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of each should be disclosed. See iU.
290. The FDIC Request for Comment and the OCCBulletin are addressed only to banks and
FDIC insurance. See generally 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494; OCC Bulletin, supra note 219.
291. At a minimum, if payment does not result in discharge, that fact should be disclosed.
292. The OCC Bulletin suggests disclosure only of what happens if the card expires. SeeOCC
Bulletin, supra note 219, at 10.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994).
294. See id. §§ 1661-1665b.
1070
STORED VALUE CARDS AND THE CONSUMER
they have the essential features of cash: SVCs are not legal tender;
SVCs are not money; SVCs merely represent a claim.295
Disclosure is necessary, but it is not sufficient because consumers
also need laws that require all SVC systems to provide a minimum
level of protection and integrity.296 Certain practices should be
mandated to prevent SVC systems from operating in an unfair
manner. Issuers should not be allowed to change the terms and
conditions absent notice to the card purchaser. In on-line and off-
line accountable systems, consumers should be entitled to receive
upon request their account balances and a transaction history of at
least two months free or at a nominal charge. Few consumers ever
would need this accounting, but if SVCs holding substantial sums
become available, in rare instances a consumer might have a critical
need for this history. Issuers of SVCs also should be required to
establish a limited form of error resolution procedure. For example,
if a consumer purchases a defective card, the issuer should have a
mechanism through which the consumer can file a complaint. The
issuer should be required to investigate and to inform the consumer
of the results of the investigation and of its response to the complaint
within a specified period of time.
SVC legislation should provide that consumer payment using SVCs
is final and discharges the consumer's obligation to the person to
whom value has been transferred. The merchant, the issuer, and
others should be able to provide for allocation of risk among
themselves by contract or system rules free of regulation. Final
payment and discharge rules protecting consumers comport with
reasonable consumer expectations. Sellers whom the obligor has not
paid should not be able to approach the consumer, forcing the
consumer to pay twice or replevying goods the consumer purchased.
Congress should consider the need to enact legislation that would
ensure the financial soundness of those responsible to pay SVC claims
or should establish an insurance fund to protect consumers when that
responsible party is insolvent At present, SVC consumers enjoy
limited protection. The FDIC General Counsel has interpreted the
EDIA to require insurance coverage of a limited category of SVC
transactions."' State and federal regulatory agencies monitor
295. See Task Force, supra note 238, at 30-31; see also supra text accompanying notes 239-44
(discussing misleading nature of characterizing SVC as money transfer).
296. See generally Griffih L. Garwood et al., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 777 (1993) (discussing lessons learned from disclosure patterns and determining future
trends for disclosure requirements).
297. See FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,
49,491 (1996).
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financial institutions to make sure they are complying with rules to
ensure their safety and soundness, and some states have insurance
funds to protect consumers who buy from money transmitters.298
Failure to provide national safeguards to protect SVC consumers in
the event of the failure of a major SVC provider may result in
substantial monetary loss and may destroy the public's confidence in
SVCs and perhaps in electronic payment systems in general.
The SVC statute should provide consumers with a private right of
action and attorneys fees for violation of the minimal requirements
that the proposed statute would impose. Other federal laws govern-
ing consumer payment systems contain these features. 2 9 Without
these provisions, the transaction costs of litigating violations of the law
preclude most actions. Consequently, the law would be an empty
threat in most cases except when a viable class action might be
possible. In addition, the statute should provide that it is unlawful to
deprive consumers of their right of action through pre-dispute
arbitration agreements."' 0
The requirements and other provisions proposed here are not a
radical departure from current practice. For the most part, they
merely subject companies transmitting monetary value through SVCs
to the same type of rules and standards to which those companies
already are subject. In fact, many states impose far more onerous
requirements upon money transmission companies that sell money
orders and travelers' checks.30 '
CONCLUSION
The stored value card is a product that promises an attractive and
convenient alternative to other types of payment devices for consum-
ers in certain situations. The card is a logical step in the perhaps
ineluctable march toward a completely electronic money system.
Consumers, however, are confused about the nature of the cards and
about their rights and obligations when they use the cards. This is
understandable because of the different architectures of various cards
and their similarities to and differences from other electronic
payment systems. Moreover, the cards contain many features and
298. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW art. XIII-C (McKinney 1996).
299. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1994); Electronic Fund Transfers, id. §
1693m; Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, id. § 2310(d).
300. See generally Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL.. 268 (1995)
(discussing arbitration contracts currently used).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 279-82 (listing various state restrictions on companies
that sell money orders and travelers' checks).
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risks that make the informed use of the cards essential. To ensure
the integrity of this payment system, clear legal rules are necessary to
fill the present vacuum, and a minimal level of protection is vital to
protect consumers and preserve public confidence. For these reasons,
federal legislation is necessary.

